After dropping for a century, the average retirement age for U.S. males seems to have leveled off in recent decades. An important question is whether as future improvements in technology cause wages to rise, desired retirement ages will resume their downward trend, or not. This paper attempts to use HRS panel data to test how relatively high (or low) earnings affect male retirement ages. Our goal is to use cross-sectional earning differences to help anticipate likely time-series developments in coming decades. Our preliminary regression results show that higher earnings do lead to somewhat earlier retirement. Unless additional analysis changes the parameter estimates, the implication is that the downward trend in male retirement ages will ultimately return.
Life-Cycle Models: Lifetime Earnings and the Timing of Retirement
Introduction
After dropping for a century, the average retirement age for U.S. males seems to have leveled off in recent decades. An important question is whether as future improvements in technology cause wages to rise, desired retirement ages will resume their downward trend, or not. This paper attempts to use HRS panel data to test how relatively high (or low) earnings affect male retirement ages. Our goal is to use cross-sectional earning differences to help anticipate likely time-series developments in coming decades.
Our theoretical framework is the life-cycle model of household behavior. This paper builds from a general first-order restriction for optimal household retirement based on a so-called "free endpoint" condition from optimal control theory (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz [1981] ). This condition may be adapted to a wide variety of life-cycle models and implies that, when choosing its best retirement age, a household balances its loss of current earnings, converted to units of utility, against its utility gain from retirement. The free endpoint condition generates our regression equations.
At this stage our tentative conclusion is that higher earnings may lead to earlier retirement. We believe that we have not yet exhausted the potential of our analysis, however, and that additional steps, which we outline below, may attenuate this connection.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework, which is based on the life-cycle model of household behavior. Section 3 uses a firstorder condition for optimal retirement age to derive equations for estimation. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents our estimation procedure and results.
1 Section 6 concludes.
Basic Framework
We begin with a basic life-cycle framework. We derive our basic optimality condition for retirement and use it to construct a regression equation. The regression equation is the basis for this paper's empirical analysis.
For expositional convenience, begin with a single member household. The household chooses (i) how much to consume at each age and (ii) the age at which it will retire. Assume that work options are discrete: employers require full-time work; to obtain reduced work hours, an individual must retire altogether. The household starts at age and date 0, lives to age T , and, when not retired, has earnings flow y t . The household solves
1 An earlier version of this paper, presented at the RRC Conference in Washington, 8/2007 , employed linearizations and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The present version eschews linearizations to obtain more precise results and turns to direct, nonlinear estimation of first-order conditions based on the method of moments. subject to:ȧ t = r · a t + y t − c t ,
The function ϕ(a R , R) gives post-retirement utility conditional on retirement age R :
subject to:ȧ t = r · a t − c t ,
Formulation I. Our basic formulation of the life-cycle model assumes intratemporal additivity of consumption expenditure and leisure. 2 It assumes that for some γ < 1 and
A household thus enjoys an improved utility function after retirement. Indeed, it is the prospect of this improvement that causes an agent to retire in the first place.
Analysis. Under Formulation I, this paper's attention focuses on the magnitude of γ . As we shall see, it is γ that determines the likely correlation between the magnitude of earnings and optimal retirement age. Maximizing in (1)-(2) with respect to consumption is a familiar problem. The solution is
Maximizing with respect to retirement age R is a somewhat less common procedure. We can maximize with respect to R taking (4) as given. This yields our so-called free endpoint condition (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz [1981] , Silverman [2005, 2007] ):
According to this condition, at the moment of its optimal retirement a household's loss of earnings, y R , converted to units of utility through multiplication by the marginal utility of expenditure, [c t ] γ−1 , exactly counterbalances the gain in flow utility Γ from retiring. If the left-hand side of (5) exceeds the right, the advantage of working longer overwhelms the advantage of immediate retirement; hence, if the left-hand side exceeds the right, the household should postpone its retirement beyond the age specified in (5) .
Combining conditions (4)- (5), we have a basic equation: at optimal retirement age R, one has
Suppose that earnings rise proportionately at every age for later cohorts. Changes in y R and Y (R) cancel one another. However, if γ ∈ (0 , 1), the second left-hand side term leads to ever greater retirement ages. If γ < 0, the second term leads to ever earlier retirement ages. If γ = 0, desired retirement age remains the same. Formulation II. A second possible formulation has non-separable utility. We specify it as follows: for some γ < 1 and λ > 1, household flow utility satisfies
A household thus enjoys an improved utility function after retirement as every level of consumption generates a higher level of utility. The analysis is only slightly different in the context of this paper -in particular, given this paper's data set (see below). In the denominator of the expression for c 0 above we need (see, for example, Laitner and Silverman [2005, 2007] 
The free endpoint condition is
Inspection shows that this is observationally equivalent to (5) when γ = 0 in the latter (leaving the only difference between the two models in the denominator of the expression for c 0 ). In one empirically plausible case, average male retirement age does not change over time. Then Formulation I leads us to estimate γ = 0. In respects beyond the scope of this paper -say, households' response to risk or to changing interest rates -γ = 0 can be very restrictive. Formulation II, on the other hand, implies a constant average retirement age over time for any value γ < 1, conceivably giving one latitude to pick values of γ to fit other aspects of a larger data set.
Given this paper's primary goal, it henceforth utilizes Formulation I, which is simpler. If we estimate γ = 0, then future work will turn to potentially richer, non-separable specifications.
Couples. Empirical prevalence leads us to focus on couples rather than single-adult households. We consider two cases. Our empirical work at this point, however, focuses on the first.
No Retirement Complementarity. In one specification, spouses vicariously benefit from each others utility but their household does not gain additional utility when both are retired together.
Returning to Formulation I, let the male's gain from retirement be Γ m and the female's Γ f . To take into account the idea that two adults may be able to live more cheaply than two singles, let a couple correspond to v t "equivalent adults" (e.g., Tobin [1967] ). Let y f (t , R f ) be the wife's earnings, which are 0 for t ≥ R f (and, perhaps, at other ages). Similarly, let y m (t , R m ) be the husband's earnings at household age t. For concreteness, think of the household's age as the husband's age.
First, for a given R f , think of the household as solving
subject to:
If all households have the same utility function, then differences in male age-earning profile shapes (which determine y m R ), in male and female lifetime earnings, and in family composition profiles (which determine v s , 0 ≤ s ≤ T ) would determine interhousehold differences in R = R m . We might setη = 0, or we might assume thatη is a random variable (with mean 0) that reflects measurement error on the left-hand side of (13) . Alternatively, we might assume that heterogeneity of preferences sets the right-hand side of (13) -in the sense that household i derives pleasure Γ m · e η i from male retirement, with η i an iid sampling from a random variableη with mean 0. In general, this paper adopts the latter assumption.
Our focus is γ. Accordingly, at this stage we calibrate ν = 0.0273 on the basis of Laitner and Silverman [2007] . 7 And, we treat the left-hand side terms in (13) not varying with retirement age or earnings as a constant α:
In practice, of course, different households have different numbers of children and different timing of marriage and fertility. Although our data set has the virtue of measuring such factors, we leave their inclusion for future work. Our version of (13) is
Although one could think of (14) as implicitly determining R = R m and then attempt to apply nonlinear least squares techniques, we estimate first-order condition (14) directly, using method of moments estimation. Thinking of the left-hand side of (14) as q i (α , γ) and of the sample size as I, we estimate (α , γ) from a set of moment equations
where Z i is a vector of instruments. Since we assume E[η] = 0, the first component of Z i can be 1 -in other words,
To estimate two parameters, however, we need at least one more instrument. Choosing ln(y m R ) or Y m (R) would be unsatisfactory because both depend on R, which (implicitly) is the endogenous variable in our equation. Our choice for a second instruement below is an index e μ i of the earning ability of the male in household i. Although we must estimate μ i , our data set has 20 or more observations of male earnings for most households. We use
Our second instrument is hardly unassailable. One might think, for instance, of each young household as having a vector of characteristics
, where η i reflects male taste for leisure, μ i male earning ability, η f i female taste for leisure, μ f i female earning ability, and κ i taste for children (i.e., desired number of children). There is a distribution of this vector in the population. We can assume the expected value of the vector in the population is 0 with little sacrifice of generality since our earning dynamics equation and (14) include unrestricted constants. The second moments of the vector are a different matter, however. If e[η i · μ i ] = 0 (or E[η i · e μ i ] = 0) this paper's second instrument is valid. Otherwise, it is not. Future work will investigate alternative instruments.
Data
The data set that we use is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
8 In addition to demographic information, the HRS provides panel data on the retirement choices of older Americans. Further, it has lifetime earning records in the form of linked annual Social Security earning data for many of its men and women.
Male Retirement. The HRS asks men and women twice whether they are retired and what year they retired. We use the questions in sequence. If either says "retired," we set the individual's R to the minimum of the listed year and the current year. We also check annual market-work hours in each survey wave.If a retired male subsequently works more than 1500 hours in a year, we drop his household from our sample -assuming that he retired but then changed his mind and returned to work.
9
Male Earnings. The linked Social Security annual earning figures have the virtue of comprehensiveness -annual records go all the way back to 1951 -and of administrativerecord quality. Their disadvantages include right censoring at the Social Security earnings cap prior to 1981, and censoring at 100000, 250000, or 500000 thereafter (for reasons of confidentiality); lack of records for non-FICA jobs prior to 1981; and, lack of measurements of work hours. (After 1992, we have bi-annual HRS survey data, including both earnings and hours.) An additional potential problem, not peculiar to the HRS, is that earnings immediately prior to retirement might reflect shortened work hours or a period of disinvestment in human capital in anticipation of retirement.
We proceed as follows. We estimate an earnings dynamics equation for males:
where X it contains a quadratic in experience and time dummies (reflecting technological progress); the first error component, μ i , is a random individual effect; it is an annual, white-noise error that is independent of the individual effect; and, (μ i , it ) is bivariate normal. We estimate (17) separately for high school and college graduates. We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). We know which observations are censored, and our estimation can take that into account as follows. Let
, let observations at times s be uncensored, and let observations at times t be censored. Then we solve
where i refers to households and φ(., h) to the normal density function with precision h. We want (18) to reflect full-time earnings, so we exclude observations with less than 4 quarters of Social Security earning credit for the year, with an earning amount less than 1500 annual hours times the minimum wage, or within two years of starting work or retiring. 10 In a second approach, we additionally exclude observations (other than the first or last) adjoining a blank -the worry being that a male might, for example, have taken a non-FICA job and started or finished that job in the middle of a year -and males with less than 10 earning observations. Table A1 in the Appendix presents details on our sample size; Table A2 presents our earning-dynamics regression results.
Our next step predicts male earnings at every working age from (17) . This has the advantage of overcoming censoring, imputing earnings from non-FICA jobs, and avoiding potential understatement of earning ability immediately prior to retirement (see the warning above). It has the potential disadvantage of overstating earnings during periods of unemployment or part-time work. Our measure of Y m (R m ) is the present value, with interest rate r = 0.04, at age 50 of male earnings between the age of starting work and R m . In fact, by no means all males reach retirement in the survey data. We adapt our first-order condition to encompass this below. Furthermore, we write Y m (S) to mean the present value at age 50 of lifetime male earnings if the male reaches retirement in the survey, or earnings up to the maximum age the male attains in the survey data if the latter is short of his retirement age. Similarly for y m S and Y f (S). The correction for censoring seems to make a substantial difference (although our "tighter" samples, somewhat surprisingly, do not). In the high school educated sample, out of 11,620 observations, 3564 are censored and our imputations are higher in 2663 cases. 11 The average increase for the prediction for the 3564 censored figures is about 15 10 We assume a male with ED years of education starts work at age = min {ED + 6, 18}. )] where the role of S is described above. We use our earnings dynamics equation (17) , disregarding the short-term shocks iS . Then with the notation of (18),
We construct Y m (S) from the present value at each age t between starting work and S of X it · β m . As always, compute the present value as of male age 50. Then
Returning to (14) , let Y post (S) be the present value at age 50 of male earnings after retirement. (If the male does not reach retirement in the survey, this is 0. Otherwise, we take the earnings figures directly from the data, not using the earnings dynamics equation in this case.) Then
Finally, our second instrument comes from Table A3 in the Appendix provides summary descriptions of key variables.
Estimation
We first describe the remainder of our estimation procedure. Then we present outcomes.
A complication in our estimation arises from the fact that not all males reach retirement within the sample time frame. In one instance, a man becomes disabled and leaves work at age prior to his optimal retirement age R m as computed in our model. 12 In a second instance, a man dies before retiring. In a third, our last survey occurs before a man reaches retirement. We call these cases with S < R m . 13 In the notation of (14)- (15), when S < R m for household i, we assume that q i = q i (α , γ) provides an upper bound for η i . In other words, we assume that the male has less desire to retire than the level which would have induced his retirement prior to disability, death, or the last survey. Assuming η is N (0 , σ 2 ), for households with S < R m we have
where φ(., h) is the normal density function and h is the precision, h = 1/σ. To implement (23), we need to estimate σ. For households with S < R m , we have
Our complete estimation is then as follows. Define S ≡ min {R m , last sample age} and define
We derive our estimate ( α , γ , σ) by finding (α , γ , σ) that satisfies three moment equations. Let
. Then the first two moment equations are
where Z i is as in (16) . Let Table 1 below presents results. For the standard and tight samples of households with both high school and college-graduate male heads, each γ is less than 0, though greater than -0.5. This is true for either set of instruments in (16) . The T-statistics are large.
The estimates suggest that higher earnings induce somewhat earlier retirement. The implied effect is stronger in the samples of households headed by high school graduates. This is preliminary work, however. Further steps will add a number of additional covariates. Several reasons to anticipate that final estimates of γ might be even closer to 0 are: (i) correcting earnings for income taxes will tend to lower y m S by a household's marginal tax rate and Y m (S) + Y post (S) + Y f (S) by its average tax rate -with the marginal rate quite possibly tending to be higher relative to the average rate for higher earners; and, (ii) higher earning households may tend to have fewer children -which will affect (13) if we stop simplifying through (14) . As noted, we need to investigate alternatives to the second instrument in Z i as well.
Conclusion
We have set up a nonstochastic life-cycle model of household behavior and derived a first-order condition for optimal retirement. Using HRS panel data on older married couples, including lifetime Social Security earning records for both men and women, we have derived method of moments estimates of several key parameters. With an additively separable utility function, we can estimate the additional utility flow accruing to males after retirement. More important, if we assume that utility is isoelastic in consumption, the sign of the corresponding exponent parameter predicts whether households with higher earnings will tend to retire earlier or later. Zero is the borderline case -implying an optimal retirement age independent of earning level. At this point, all of our results point toward an isoelastic parameter near zero but negative. A negative parameter implies higher earnings tend to lead to earlier optimal retirement age. There are, however, many interesting steps remaining for the future, and the text outlines how we anticipate that we will proceed. 
